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RECOGNITION OF LEGISLATIVE INTERESTS IN CONFLICTS
CASES ARISING UNDER THE FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT CLAUSE.
INTRODUCTION
At the common law, courts and scholars recognized that each state
possessed exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territorial
limits.' Conversely, they recognized that no state could "by its laws,
directly affect, or bind property out of its own territory, or bind persons
not resident therein, whether they are natural-born subjects or others."'2
Since persons and objects did frequently cross territorial boundaries and
acquire status in several states, the common law courts were required to
select the appropriate law to govern the disposition of the suit. Hence,
the division of political society into territorial units was the factor which
gave rise to Conflict of Laws.
At the common law, it was thought that conflict of laws rules were
founded upon principles of sovereignty. Laws emanated from and were
enforced by the sovereign. The authority and power of the sovereign
over the persons and objects within the boundaries of the state was un-
questioned. In order to select the appropriate law in a conflicts case,
traditional analysis required the common law courts to examine the re-
lationships between the person or object involved and the respective
sovereigns. Consequently, each conflicts decision represented a balancing
of sovereign powers and a selection of that sovereign's law which seemed
to most directly affect the person or object in the suit.
Today, much of the concern and confusion in the conflicts field re-
sults from a failure to critically examine the sources of the law. 4 The
common law position that conflicts rules are founded upon principles of
sovereignty has fallen into disrepute. That approach de-emphasized, and
perhaps disregarded, social and economic factors. At the same time, it
overemphasized the position of government5 in its relation to the law.
The writer submits that a study of social, economic, and political factors
is essential to the determination of the sources of conflicts rules and will
aid in the clarification of analysis in the conflicts field.
'STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 21 (6th ed. 1865).
2Id. at 22.
'The term ''sovereign'' or "sovereignty" is difficult to define. To examine every
facet of the term is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that a sovereign
is "one who possesses supreme authority, especially a person or a determinate body
of persons in whom the supreme power of the state is vested." 2 BRITANNICA
WORLD LANGUAGE DICTIONARY 1201 (Funk & Wagnalls ed. 1958). The views ex-
pressed in this paragraph are set out as an exposition of the common law position.
They do not represent the writer's position.
'Sources of law are the institutional interests from ''which particular positive laws
derive their authority and coercive force." Part of the definition is provided in
BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY 1568 (4th ed. 1951). For a definition of "institutional
interests" see the body of this article, infra.
'Government is used here in the sense of an ''institution.'
[Vol. 26,
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An emphasis upon the social, economic, and political factors in so-
ciety necessarily suggests an analysis of the "institutions" which make
up that society.6 An "institution" is an organization wherein each indi-
vidual is assigned his position and function in society for varying pur-
poses. 7 It may be a combination of persons, an economic, or a religious
unit; moreover, customs and mores find expression at every institutional
level. These institutions provide the framework in which society operates.
Laws are enacted to legitimize their existence. Other laws are created as
the institutions change. Still others are passed to preserve political, eco-
nomic, or social thoughts emanating from the institutions. In effect, the
law becomds a reflection of the institutional interests of each state.
8
The function of conflicts rules can only be defined by reference to
the institutions which the rules represent.9 Certain conflicts rules serve a
power-recognition function and have been labelled "jurisdictional" con-
flicts rules.10 The jurisdictional rule is applied to recognize in a given
state a superior legislative interest 1 in a particular lawsuit. Other con-
flicts rules serve a policy-supporting function and have been labelled
"choice of law" conflicts rules. A choice of law rule need not be applied
in a given case unless its application is necessary to protect or support the
policies of the state with superior legislative interest.
The importance of giving consideration to the source of conflicts
rules becomes apparent in cases arising under the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution.12 The purpose of the clause is to
'See Briggs, Jurisdiction by Statute, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 237 n.63 (1963).
'EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw 24, 40, 79, 85, 116,
118 (Moll transl. 1936). An organization is essentially a rule of conduct. See
EHRLICH, supra at 24. An individual or a thing may, of course, be a member of
many institutions. A businessman, for example, is a member of the nation, the state,
his local fraternal group, his family, his church, his type of business activity, and
many others. Nevertheless, each of these memberships shapes his function and posi-
tion in society for differing ends.
SLaws can reflect only a part of the institutional interests of a state. However, some
institutions find expression by incorporation in other institutions. As an example,
many established customs are never codified and yet they find expression in court
made law.
'Such an approach and its use of a dual category of conflicts rules was originally
set down by Professor Edwin Briggs in 1943. See Briggs, The Dual Relationship of
the Rules of Conflict of Laws in the Succession Field, 15 Miss. L.J. 77 (1943). See
also Briggs, The Jurisdictional-Choice of Law Relation in Conflicts Rules, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 1165 (1948); Briggs, Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy
Centered Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1953); Briggs, The Need for the
"Legislative Jurisdictional Principle" in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws, 39
MINN. L. REV. 517 (1955). For a graphic interpretation of the dual category see
the article in 6 VAND. L. REV. at 669.
The scope of the application of the dual category has not yet been defined.
However, it has recognized utility in problems involving subject matter jurisdiction.
To this date it has been applied to conflicts cases dealing with land, tangible move-
ables, marriage, torts, intangibles, and procedure. This paper seeks to establish its
utility in conflicts cases arising under the full faith and credit clause.
'
0 For an expanded discussion of the jurisdictional-choice of law dichotomy, see the
body of this article, infra.
"By "legislative interest" the writer does not wish to denote only formal laws
enacted by the legislative branch of a government. Rather, legislative interest is
used to show the affiliation which an institution in a given state has with the subject
matter or person in a suit.
'
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
1964]
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alter the status of states as independent "sovereignties"'13 and to make
them integral parts of the nation.14 The United States Supreme Court
wields an awesome power by means of full faith and credit which, if
used without weighing and analyzing the interests of each state, could
result in unjustified infringements upon state interests.15
This article will discuss, first, the function which, in an institutional
framework, certain conflicts rules serve, and second, the utility of such
an analysis of court determinations under the full faith and credit clause.
II. ANALYSIS.
A. THE JURISDICTIONAL RULE.
Since a forum court in a conflicts case is usually confronted with
numerous laws, it must initially select the law which controls the suit.16
At this point in the forum's analysis, it must ask whether some one state
has paramount legislative interest. 17 If it finds such a state, then it will
determine the issues as would the court of that state.18 To illustrate,
'The term "sovereign" or "sovereignties" is used by the courts in their interpreta-
tions of the full faith and credit clause.
"Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340
U.S. 581 (1951).
'Although the full faith and credit clause applies to public acts as well as judgments,
a consideration of public acts cases is beyond the scope of this paper. It should be
noted, however, that very few general rules have been laid down in this area due
to the peculiarities of the statutes involved. Two rules are well established. One
state need not substitute the laws of another in deciding the case. See, e.g., Pacific
Employer's Ins. Co. v. Indus. Ace. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939). Nor is a
state required to enforce foreign statutes which confer a right that is obnoxious to
the public policy of the forum. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265
(1888); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Finney v. Guy, 189 U.S. 335
(1903); see also Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S.
611 (1915); of., Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U.S. 16 (1918).
For an example of weighing and analyzing of state interests in public acts
cases, see Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935);
see also Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210-11 (1941) ; Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939); State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 160 (1945); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611
(1951) ; Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932) (dictum) ; Broderick
v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642 (1935) (dictum).
"When the jurisdictional rule is applied, the laws of other states will, for the most part,
be rejected. Although the basis of such rejection is not always clear, courts have
acknowledged that the subject matter involved and the over-all nature of the litigation
play an important part in the decision. See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d
859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d
365 (1957); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959); Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949); Emery v. Emery, 45
Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); see also Learned Hand's analysis in Scheer v.
Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942, 944 (2d Cir. 1934).
'"In some conflicts cases there may be no state with a recognizable superior legislative
interest. However, conflicts cases may be broken down into four categories: (1) The
cases in which there is a clearly recognizable superior legislative interest. (2) The
cases in which several states may have significant contacts. In this class, a study
of the precise issues in the litigation reveals the primacy of interest. (3) The cases
in which there is no significant contact with any state. Here the forum may ''pick
and choose." (4) The cases in which the states recognize a common interest and
decide the legal relations on that basis. These categories are given in an as yet
unpublished manuscript by Briggs entitled General Theory for "Conflicts'!, Based
in a Genuine "Sociology of Law."
"This approach should not be confused with the traditional use of the term renvoi to
[Vol. 26,
3
Haines: Recognition of Legislative Interests in Conflicts Cases Arising Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1964
NOTES
assume that a quiet title action has been instituted in the forum state,
F, and that the land is located in a second state, S. Due to the unique
character of land, the established conflicts rule is that the law of the
situs of land delimits all interests in it.19 Consequently, F refers to the
law of S, using the situs rule as its jurisdictional rule. F does so in recog-
nition of S's superior legislative interest in the land and must, of neces-
sity, abdicate its own legislative interest in making the reference.
On the other hand, in this quiet title action, if the forum is also the
situs of the land, the court may choose either to apply its own internal-
domestic law or the law of a foreign state to finally dispose of the suit.20
If the forum decides that its own laws are adequate to determine all the
issues, it simply applies its internal law. If the forum refers to foreign
law by means of a choice of law conflicts rule, such reference does not
concede legislative power in the foreign state nor function as a power-
recognition rule, but merely is used to effectuate the exclusive legislative
policies initially recognized in the forum-situs.
A situs rule for immoveables 21 which recognizes a superior legislative
interest in the situs state is consistent with an acknowledgment of the
legislative power of that state, the economic nature of the immoveable,
and commercial convenience. 22 An owner's rights in the immoveable are
capable of definition only in the state wherein the immoveable is situ-
ated.23 Hence, the scope and "content of the right[s] of ownership in
each immoveable is determined, either positively or negatively .. ."24
by the law of the situs, and that law is drawn from the economic nature
of the thing.25 As Ehrlich points out: "The economic nature of a thing
describe the "sitting and judging" theory as illustrated in In re Annesley, [1926]
1 Ch. 692. Compare the articles by Griswold and Briggs found in Ass 'N OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 160-188, 189-196 (1956).
See also Briggs, An Institutional Approach to Conflict of Laws: "Law and Beason"
Versus Professor Ehrenzweig, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 29 (1964).
"uSee, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Kerr v. Moon, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 565 (1824); M'Cormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192
1825); Montgomery v. Samory, 99 U.S. (9 Otto.) 482 (1878); Smith v. McCann, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 398 (1860), where the legal and equitable interests were controlled
by the situs; Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U.S. (11 Otto.) 352 (1879); Carpenter
v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891).
At this point in the forum's analysis, it may use a "choice of law" conflicts rule
because the forum recognizes in itself a superior legislative interest. The choice
made will depend upon the legislative policies of the forum state.
2An immoveable may be defined as "property which, from its nature, destination, or
the object to which it is applied, cannot move itself, or be removed." BLACK, LAW
DICTIONARY 885 (4th ed. 1951).
'The reasons given are consistent with those of the most recent Restatement. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note §§ 214-254 at 12-14
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
2Only the situs state has the ''exclusive power to promulgate the law which shall regu-
late its [the immoveables] ownership and transfer." In re Schneider 's Estate, 96
N.Y.S.2d 652, 656 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
24EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 100. Note should be made that the terms "ownership"
and "possession" have been made interchangeable by statutes. See, e.g., REVISED
CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 67-201. For a discussion of this point, see EHRLICH,
supra note 7, at 103-104.
'See EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 94-104, 116, 328 for discussion on immoveables.
1964]
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determines the relation between the owner and a neighbor; it determines
the inner organization of the undertaking which it subserves and the posi-
tion of the latter in commerce. '2 6 The law of the situs reflects these facts.
Finally, commercial convenience and certainty are assured if the situs
rule is used.27 If state laws other than those of the situs are applied,
certainty of outcome in commercial transactions involving imnimoveables
would be undermined. There must be uniformity and predictability of
result which can only be obtained by reference to the law of a particular
state, the situs state.
B. DELIMITATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL RULE.
The recognition of a "jurisdictional" conflicts rule does not foreclose
the application of several states' laws to the facts in a conflicts case.
The rule does, however, determine the function played by the other laws
by limiting their applicability to situations demanded by the policies of the
state with superior legislative interest. The three illustrations that follow
define, to some degree, the scope of the jurisdictional rule.
1. Land.
Fall v. Eastin28 illustrates the inability of a state, not the situs, to con-
trol the conveyance of land. In that case, a husband acquired title to land
in Nebraska. Thereafter, he and his wife moved to Washington where
the latter instituted divorce proceedings. The divorce decree was accom-
panied by an order compelling the husband to convey title to the land
situated in Nebraska. The husband did not comply with the order and,
in fact, conveyed the land to third parties. The wife later brought suit
in Nebraska wherein she pleaded the Washington judgment and a deed
given by an agent of the Washington court as placing title in her. The
Nebraska court held that it did not have to give full faith and credit to
the Washington judgment and therefore, quieted title in the conveyees
of the husband.29 The decision was affirmed by the United States Su-
preme Court.30
The Fall case illustrates an interesting point. Had the husband com-
plied with the order of the Washington court and conveyed the land to
his wife, the effectiveness of the conveyance would not have been due to
the power that the Washington court had over the husband, but rather to
the power of Nebraska, as situs, in allowing the conveyance to stand
under full faith and credit. Nebraska,31 being the situs, had the power to
2EHRLICH, supra note 7, at 102.
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 22, at 13. See also EHRLICH,
supra note 7, at 103.
-215 U.S. 1 (1909).
2Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. 120, 113 N.W. 175 (1907).
3'Supra note 28.
"Two recent cases have reconsidered the problem raised in Fall V. Eastin, supra note
28, and have come to opposite conclusions after considering the legislative policies
of the states involved. Compare Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682
[Vol. 26,
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delimit all interests affecting title to that land and recognized this power
in itself. Moreover, the court would uphold a voluntary conveyance by
the husband but would not allow a conveyance by an agent of the foreign
state. The reason is simply that the situs-court asserts different policy
considerations in each situation. The conveyance by the husband is his
own act and normally the situs-court would not look behind the trans-
action, but a conveyance by an agent of a non-situs court is ineffectual
because the situs reserves unto itself the power to delimit interests in
land. 32
2. Situs and Succession to Moveables.
The rule prevails in the United States 33 and arguably in England3 4
that the situs delimits interests in tangible moveables. 35 The doctrine
springs, as with land, from the territorial theory of conflicts wherein it
is declared that "every State has the right to regulate persons and things
within its own territory according to its own sovereign will and pleas-
ure." 36 The rule performs the same function as the situs rule for land.
It is essentially a power-recognition rule placing the law of the situs of
the moveable as the controlling law.37
(1959), with McElreath v. McElreath, 331 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). The
Nebraska court in the Weesner decision gave full faith and credit to a Wyoming
divorce decree ordering the delivery of real property in Nebraska to a wife in lieu
of alimony. The court reasoned that its legislative polices did not prohibit such a
decision, although it recognized that a court of one state may not directly affect title
to real property in another state. In McElreath, a Texas court refused to give full
faith and credit to an Oklahoma divorce decree affecting property in Texas since
such an approach would contravene the public policy of Texas.
82For further discussion see Briggs, Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy
Centered Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 667, 677-78 (1953); Comment, Validity
of Deed Given under Compulsion of "Foreign" Court, 12 MONT. L. REv. 59 (1951).
See also Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 (1910); Morris v. Hand, 70 Tex. 481, 8
S.W. 210 (1888).
"Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); City Bank v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112
(1934); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Riley v. N.Y. Trust Co., 315
U.S. 343 (1942). See also these early state cases: Desebats v. Berquier, 1 Binn. 335
(Pa. 1808); Jones v. Marable, 6 Humph. 116 (Tenn. 1845). See Briggs, The Juris-
dictional--Choice of Law Relation in Conflicts Rules, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1167-73
(1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note, §§ 254a-310,
at 78-82 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).8
'LALIVE, THE TRANSFER OF CHATTELS IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 116-20, 126-27 (1955);
ZAPHIRIoU, THE TRANSFER OF CHATTELS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 77-78, 81-82
(1956); Briggs, "Renvoi'" In the Succession to Tangibles: A False Issue Based on
Faulty Analysis, 64 YALE L.J. 195, 197 et seq. (1954).
mNote that the Restatement section on moveables includes a consideration of both tangi-
ble and intangible moveables. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra
note 33, at 78 et seq. (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959). In the case of intangibles, courts
have been reluctant to attribute a "situs" to them. See, e.g., In re Estate of Waits,
23 Cal. 2d 676, 146 P.2d 5, 8 (1944). However, courts have recognized, expressly
or tacitly, that the intangible may have institutional ties with other entities which
give it a situs. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Super. Ct., 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
"Jones v. Marable, 6 Humph. 116, 118 (Tenn. 1845).
"7Since we have defined the law to be a reflection of the social, economic, and political
interests of a state, the institutional interests of a state, the situs rule for moveables
may be restated as follows: it is essentially a rule which recognizes that the institu-
tional policies in the situs state govern the disposition of the suit. Any references
to other states' laws are controlled by those institutional policies of the situs state,
and therefore, the situs' law is controlling.
1964]
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The question then arises: What effect should be given to the rule
that the law of the domicile governs the succession to interests in move-
ables? The United States Supreme Court has held that the domiciliary
rule is used to complement the power-recognition situs rule.38  It, in
effect, becomes a choice of law rule used by the situs to fulfill its, the
situs', own legislative purposes. 39 As the Court stated:
[D]ecisions shown that the power to regulate the transmission,
administration, and distribution of tangible personal property on
the death of the owner rests with the State of its situs, and that
the laws of other States have no bearing save as that State ex-
pressly or tacitly adopts them-their bearing then being attribut-
able to such adoption and not to any force of their own.
40
Hence, if the situs is the forum state, reference to the law of the domicile
in no way limits the application of the legislative purposes of the situs.
On the contrary, the reference is made to extend or uphold the situs'
recognized superior legislative interest in the suit.
The forum state may also be the domiciliary state with the tangible
moveable situated elsewhere. In this situation, reference to the law of
the situs is some abdication of the legislative interests of the domicile.
However, if the situs has a choice of law rule referring back to the domi-
ciliary state's law, the forum court should have no difficulty in applying
its own internal law acknowledging that the situs' legislative interests will
be supported if this approach is taken.
The reasons for the application of a situs rule for moveables are
aptly stated by the latest revision of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
In some respects, a chattel occupies a position analogous to that
of an immoveable. . . . It too is within the exclusive control of
the state in which it is, and therefore, the officials of that state
are the only ones who can lawfully deal with it physically. Like-
wise, a chattel can be said to be of greatest concern to the state
in which it is at the time in question.
41
Moreover, the revision council acknowledged that certainty in commercial
transactions is aided by the use of the situs rule.
42
uFrick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
19The domiciliary rule performs a policy-supporting function.
"Supra note 38, at 491.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT Or LAWS, supra note 33, at 78-79 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1959).
"Id. at 79. Any discussion of moveables and immoveables necessarily raises the problem
of characterization. The situs should characterize the term moveable. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 33, at 78 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
Accord, Briggs, Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy Centered Conflict
of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 667, 701 (1953). A general discussion on the problem of
characterization is outside the scope of this paper.
[Vol. 26,
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3. Torts.
The scope of the jurisdictional rule should be carefully defined so as
to give full effect to the legislative interests of all the states concerned.
The need for careful analysis is apparent in conflicts cases involving torts.
The established conflicts rule is this: the place of the injury controls all
rights arising therefrom. 43 The California decision of Emery v. Emery44
illustrates how the application of this rule, as a jurisdictional rule, is
delimited by legislative interests of states other than the place of injury.
The Emery case involved a tort action between members of the same
family arising out of an automobile accident in Idaho. All parties to the
action were domiciled in California where the suit was instituted. The
forum court was confronted with the determination of the sufficiency of
the complaint and the question of immunity from suit because of the
family relation. Although the California court initially recognized that
the place of the injury controls all rights accruing therefrom, and there-
fore referred to Idaho law, it limited the jurisdictional rule's applica-
bility to considerations of the sufficiency of the complaint. As to the
immunity issue, the court applied California law due to the substantial
role which the family relation played in the outcome of the litigation.4 5
As Mr. Justice Traynor stated:
We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit be-
cause of a family relationship are more properly determined by
reference to the law of the state of the family domicile. That
state has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulat-
ing the incidents of the family relationship and it is the only
state in which the parties can, by participation in the legislative
processes, effect a change in those incidents. Moreover, it is unde-
sirable that the rights, duties, disabilities, and immunities con-
ferred or imposed by the family relationship should constantly
change as members of the family cross state boundaries during
temporary absences from their home.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the above case the distinctive legislative interest of each state is
"See, e.g., Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258 (1933); Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222
U.S. 473, 478 (1912).
"45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
"The Wisconsin Supreme Court has agreed substantially with the approach of the
California court in the Emery decision, supra note 44, despite the fact that it had to
overrule six cases and partially overrule two others. Haumschild v. Continental Cas.
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). The Haumschild case restricted its
holding in its interpretation given to the reference to foreign law. It found that if
the suit involved a family relation, the choice of law rule of a foreign state would
never be applied. See 95 N.W.2d at 820. If this position is taken literally, the court
fails to recognize that a foreign choice of law rule may be applicable in a domestic
relation case if the forum-domiciliary state holds the application of such a rule to be
beneficial to its own legislative policies. For a criticism of one of the cases over-
ruled by the court see Briggs, Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy
Centered Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 667, 688-90 (1953).
"Supra note 44, 289 P.2d at 218.
1964]
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clear, as is the supremacy of each on the respective issues. But this is
not always true.
47
A federal district court in another tort decision expressed the place
of injury rule as the jurisdictional rule, but did not delimit the rule by
reference to other law.41 In the case both husband and wife were domi-
ciled in Pennsylvania. The wife engaged in allegedly adulterous activity
in Massachusetts, the state where the husband instituted a suit for aliena-
tion of affections. Pennsylvania had abolished a cause of action for
alienation of affections.4 9 In support of an allowance of the cause of
action under Massachusetts law, the court stated:
The social order of each [state] is implicated. As the place of
matrimonial domicil, Pennsylvania has an interest in whether
conduct in any part of the world is held to affect adversely the
marriage relationship between its domiciliaries. But, as the place
where the alleged misconduct occurred and as the place where
the alleged wrongdoer lives, Massachusetts also has an interest.
She is concerned with conduct within her borders which in her
view lowers the standards of the community where they occur.
She also is concerned when her citizens intermeddle with other
people's marriages.5 0
To further support his application of the law of the place of injury, the
judge noted the underlying factors responsible for granting Massachusetts
law supremacy: such conduct was offensive to public morals, it was sin-
ful, and Massachusetts had strong legislative interest in preventing self-
help in such situations.5 1
The writer submits that an analysis founded in social, economic and
political policy aids in the clarification of issues in conflicts cases.
Moreover, a dual category of conflicts rules, the jurisdictional-choice of
law dichotomy, established in terms of the function which the rules per-
form, seems not only justified but mandatory if the law is not to divorce
itself from policies which regulate society.
III. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE.
The propriety of a collateral proceeding to test the jurisdiction under-
lying a sister state's judgment depends upon the interpretation given to
"A case may fit into the third category of conflicts cases. See supra note 17.
4'Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949). The differing results in this case
and the Emery decision, supra note 44, can be explained by looking to the social
institutions sought to be protected. In the Emery case, the family relation was deemed
paramount whereas in Gordon, supra, the protection of social interests from disrup-
tion was of primary importance.
49Pa. Pub. Acts 1935, Pamphlet Law 450, as amended, Pa. Pub. Acts 1937, Pamphlet
Law 2317; PA. STAT. tit. 48, §§ 170-177 (Supp. 1963). Although this did not seem
to be a controlling factor in the court's determination, it was relied upon to show the
lack of legislative interest in Pennsylvania. See Gordon v. Parker, supra note 48, at
43.
5
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two legal principles as they relate to the full faith and credit clause of
the United States Constitution.12
The first principle, at least as it relates to jurisdiction over the
person, is:
Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that
those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result
of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered
forever settled as between the parties. We see no reason why this
doctrine should not apply in every case where one voluntarily
appears, presents his case and is fully heard, and why he should
not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judg-
ment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his cause.5
3
The second principle is:
[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence,
every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status
and capacities of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon
which they may contract, the forms and solemnities with which
their contracts shall be executed, the rights and obligations aris-
ing from them, and the mode in which their validity shall be
determined and their obligations enforced; and also to regulate
the manner and conditions upon which property situated within
such territory .. .may be acquired, enjoyed and transferred. 54
From the second principle comes the further proposition that "no State
can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory. '55
The United States constitutional provision56 which requires that "Full
faith and credit shall be given in each State to the . . .judicial proceed-
ings of every other State" and its implementing statute5 7 that "such ...
judicial proceedings . . .shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States ...as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State . .. from which they are taken" function to limit
the "sovereignty" of the individual states so that litigation once pursued
to judgment is ended. 58 Strictly applied, this provision would prohibit
a collateral attack on the judgments of a sister state. However, the Su-
preme Court early recognized the impropriety of such an approach. In
"'U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
5'Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931).
"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto.) 714, 722 (1877).
5Ibid.
MU.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
-128 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
58Supra note 14. See also Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901); Morris v. Jones,
329 U.S. 545 (1947).
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Thompson v. Whitman5 9 the Court held that the jurisdiction of the court
rendering the judgment could be questioned in a collateral proceeding in
another state. This rule has been tempered somewhat by a later decision
which incorporated the local doctrine of res judicata into "national juris-
prudence" by means of the full faith and credit clause.60 Litigated issues
between the same parties could not, therefore, be collaterally attacked.
Some writers, on the basis of the Chicot County6 ' case have even ex-
tended the rationale underlying res judicata to issues in conflicts cases
which were not litigated but could have been. -6 2 Since the case did not
involve a conflicts situation, it should be limited to its facts. Moreover,
the Court should allow collateral inquiry into jurisdictional issues in con-
flicts cases if sufficient grounds for the inquiry are presented.6 ' As has
been held in the Treinies6 4 case, the right to inquire into the jurisdictional
grounds of a sister state's judgment is "beyond question." To hold other-
wise could result in cases which ignore state legislative interests that are
affiliated with the cause of action.
Through the years the Court has distinguished between jurisdiction
over the person and jurisdiction over the subject matter in cases arising
under the full faith and credit clause.6 5 The distinction is apparently
based upon the fact that jurisdiction over the person may be obtained
by consent, 6 whereas jurisdiction over subject matters depends upon
location.6 7 Furthermore, in the case of personal jurisdiction, it is estab-
lished that jurisdictional issues fully litigated cannot be questioned col-
laterally by the same parties in a sister state.68 However, until recently,
no general rule had been laid down for subject matter jurisdiction. Some
'9Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1874). This position has been re-
stated many times. See, e.g., Knowles v. The Gaslight & Coke Co., 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
58 (1873); Grover & Baker Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890); Chicago
Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25 (1917).
wAmerican Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932). Accord: Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305
U.S. 165, 172 (1938); Chamblin v. Chamblin, 362 Ill. 588, 1 N.E.2d 73 (1936);
In re Hanrahan's Will, 109 Vt. 108, 122, 194 Atl. 471, 478 (1937) ; cf., Hill v. Wamp-
ler, 298 U.S. 460, 466 (1936).
aChicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
6Note, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1006 (1940); Note, 53
HARV. L. REV. 552 (1940).
"See text infra at 93.
"Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
"Personal jurisdiction: See, e.g., Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25 (1917);
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); American
Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 9 (1942);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451(1) (Supp. 1948); Durfee v. Duke, 84 Sup.
Ct. 242 (1963) Subject matter jurisdiction: See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32
(1938); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
308 U.S. 66 (1939); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); RESTATEMENT, JUDG-
MENTS § 10 (1942); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451(2) (Supp. 1948).
mBaldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Chicago Life
Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25 (1917).
6"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto.) 714 (1877); Prick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S.
473 (1925); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Riley v. N.Y. Trust Co.,
315 U.S. 343 (1942). The term "location" may be misleading when one thinks in
terms of intangibles or a cause of action. Perhaps, a better usage would be location
as determined by institutional affiliation.
"See supra note 65, and cases cited on personal jurisdiction.
[Vol. 26,
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consideration was given to the problem in Durfee v. Duke,69 decided in
December, 1963.
In the Durfee case a dispute arose over title to bottom land situated
on the Missouri River. The main channel of the river forms the boundary
between the states of Missouri and Nebraska. Petitioners brought a quiet
title action in the courts of Nebraska. Jurisdiction over the land de-
pended upon the factual determination of whether a shift in the river's
course was due to avulsion or accretion. The respondent was served, ap-
peared, and argued the issue of the location of the land. The Nebraska
courts found the land to be located in Nebraska and consequently
quieted title in the petitioners.7 0 Thereafter, respondent filed a similar
quiet title suit in a Missouri state court which was removed to a federal
district court sitting in Missouri. The district court held that the issues
litigated in Nebraska were res judicata to it and dismissed the action. On
appeal to the circuit court of appeals, the lower court was reversed and
collateral inquiry was allowed into the question of jurisdiction over the
land. 1 The United States Supreme Court, on certiorari, held that the
Nebraska decree was entitled to full faith and credit. 72
The Durfee case gave the Court its first opportunity to decide whether
principles of res judicata under the full faith and credit clause should
apply to state judgments determining the location of land. The Court
relied upon four of its previous cases, two of which involved recognition
of foreign divorce decrees,7 3 one the title to personal property,7 4 and the
last the effect of a federal bankruptcy court's judgment on a state court.7 5
Since the question of subject matter jurisdiction had been litigated in
each of these cases, the Court had held that res judicata should be ap-
plied. Seeing no reason to limit the applicability of the concept in the
case of land, the Court extended its previous rationale to the Durfee case
and gave the Nebraska judgment finality. The Court made it clear, how-
ever, that the Missouri court had power to inquire into the basis of juris-
diction of the Nebraska courts.7 6 But, if the inquiry disclosed that the
jurisdictional issues had been litigated, the Nebraska judgment was en-
titled to full faith and credit in the subsequent proceeding in Missouri. 77
The Court expressly limited its holding in the Durfee decision to
6Durfee v. Duke, 84 Sup. Ct. 242 (1963).
70Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959).
71Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962).
-'Supra note 69.
nDavis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). In
Williams v. N.C., 325 U.S. 226 (1945), the Court allowed collateral inquiry into juris-
dictional issues in a divorce proceeding despite precedent disallowing such inquiry.
Williams v. N.C., 317 U.S. 287 (1942). The doctrine of the second Williams case
was considerably weakened by Sherrer, supra, and Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948). At
this time collateral inquiry cannot even be made by a third party who has not ap-
peared in the original proceeding. See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
'
4Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
'Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
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the determination of the rights of the respective parties to title in the
property. It did not decide whether, in fact, the land was located in
either state. 7 Such a question could only be presented by a direct pro-
ceeding ' or compact"° between the states. Nor was the Court faced with
the problem of determining whether the Nebraska judgment would be
entitled to full faith and credit if, in a proceeding between the states, the
land was adjudged to be located in Missouri. As Mr. Justice Black stated
in the concurring opinion:
I concur in today's reversal of the Court of Appeals judgment,
but with the understanding that we are not deciding the question
whether the respondent would continue to be bound by the Ne-
braska judgment should it later be authoritatively decided,
either in an original proceeding between the States in this Court
or by compact between the two States under Art. I, § 10, that
the disputed tract is in Missouri."'
Assuming that Missouri and Nebraska did take such action, it seems
probable that the Court, in any subsequent dispute over the land, would
deny full faith and credit to a Nebraska judgment if the land were found
to be located in Missouri.
The rule that jurisdiction over the person, once litigated, is con-
clusive upon the parties is firmly imbedded and not subject to exception.
However, the Court, even in Durfee,s 2 has recognized that exceptions can
be made in determinations involving jurisdiction over subject matter.8
Such a position is also maintained by the Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
which states:
Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines
that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot
collaterally attack the judgment on the ground that the court
did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, unless the
policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by
the policy against permitting the court to act beyond its jurisdic-
tion. Among the factors appropriate to be considered in deter-
mining that collateral attack should be permitted are that
(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is clear;
(b) the determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a ques-
tion of law rather than of fact;
71A private action and determination of location of the land cannot bind the states.
Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411 (1799); New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S.
(4 Dall.) 1 (1799) ; Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 736-37 (1947).
7Cf., Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23 (1904).
10See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
I'Durfee v. Duke, supra note 69, at 248 (concurring opinion).
2Id. at 246-247.
'Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940); Vallely v. No. Fire Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348
(1920); United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940). Note
that in these cases jurisdictional issues were not litigated in the first forum.
[Vol. 26,
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(c) the court was one of limited and not of general jurisdiction;
(d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated;
(e) the policy against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction
is strong.84
Taking subdivisions (a) and (e) together, had the Durfee case been de-
cided after Missouri and Nebraska had settled the issue of the location
of the land, the Nebraska court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter would have been clear, assuming that the land was adjudged
part of Missouri. Moreover, courts have recognized that litigation in-
volving land presents unique policy considerations.8 5 The state in which
the land is located has exclusive legislative interest in delimiting the
effectiveness of conveyances,"6 the nature of ownership, 7 and regulation
of any interests, whether legal"" or equitable,8 9 arising from that land.
Furthermore, non-situs decrees affecting the devolution of property have
been given no extra-territorial effecty 0 Hence, the scales would be tipped
in favor of collateral inquiry and full faith and credit could be denied
the Nebraska judgments.
CONCLUSION.
Inroads have been made into the integrity of the legislative interests
of the several states, not only by federal legislation and federal court
decisions, but by programs and laws adopted by the states themselves.
Uniform laws and model acts have taken on greater importance in areas
where states find common interests. The result has been a modification
of position in order to facilitate the regulation of an increasingly com-
plex society. A system of restatements has also encouraged the trend.
The development" is but another phase of man's search to find a func-
tional system of laws which not only seem compatible with the aims of
the individual governments concerned, but which also can serve as a com-
mon guide-post for regulation of society as a whole.
'4RESTATEMIENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451(2) (Supp. 1948).
-7See supra note 19, and cases cited. See also In re Schneider's Estate, 96 N.Y.S.2d
652 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
MRESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 214-18 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
811d. at §§ 219-20.
"Id. at §§ 221-24.
11d. at §§ 225-40. The effect of a foreclosure is governed by the law of the situs. Note
however, that issues which do not affect any interests in land even though they relate
to foreclosure, are governed by the law of the debt covered by the mortgage. Where
the law of the situs and debt coincide are illustrated by these cases: Maxwell v.
Ricks, 294 Fed. 255 (9th Cir. 1923) ; Crews v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 104 Ind.
App. 183, 8 N.E.2d 390 (1937); McGough v. Derby, 254 App. Div. 708, 3 N.Y.S.2d
753 (2d Dept. 1938); Stumpf v. Hallahan, 101 App. Div. 383, 91 N.Y. Supp. 1062
(1st Dept. 1905). Other cases where the situs did not correspond with the law of the
debt are: Thomson v. Hyle, 30 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897); Thompson v. Lakewood
City Dev. Co., 105 Misc. 680, 174 N.Y. Supp. 825 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ; Hall v. Hoff, 295
Pa. 276, 145 Atl. 301 (1929).
'°Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909) ; Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Carpenter
v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1891); Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 (1910).
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With the continued expansion of the application of the full faith
and credit clause by the Supreme Court, further encroachment into the
regulation of relationships between the states can be the only result.
The very purpose of the clause, as interpreted by the Court, is to limit
the applicability of "sovereignty" in considerations of conflicts ques-
tionsf1 The end result of such an approach, not improbably, could be
the evolution of a substantive federal conflicts system, the Court being
placed in the position of recognizing the controlling legislative interests
in cases falling under the full faith and credit clause. Such a position
has, at this time, been partially achieved. Its development is consistent
with the comparable trend in state adoption of uniform laws. However,
the Court is dealing with situations where the states have not, to this
point, conceded common interests. Necessarily then, the Court must be
careful to place assertions of state interest in proper perspective. 2
As an aid to all courts, the writer urges the use of a dual category of
conflicts rules. This type of reasoning is not foreign to the Supreme Court
and is receiving more and more recognition in the state courts. As has
been noted, in the case of land, the Supreme Court has continually
categorized the rule that the situs of land delimits the interests emanat-
ing therefrom as the jurisdictional rule.9 3 Other rules governing types of
litigation, as with succession, have taken a secondary position to the ini-
tial determination of the paramount legislative interest.9 4 This rationale
has also been applied in the tangible moveable field.95 1Moreover, the
Court adopted such an approach in litigation involving the Federal Tort
Claims Act where it interpreted the federal statute as functioning to
indicate the state of controlling interest.9 6 The most recent Restatement
of Conflict of Laws is also consistent with this rationale.97
It is submitted that conflicts rules should be viewed in light of the
function they perform. The importance of particular -facts in conflicts
cases requires clarity in the analysis of judges and lawyers alike. If the
jurisdictional-choice of law dichotomy in conflicts rules is used, at least
the initial step toward common understanding will have been made.
HARRY A. HAINES.





18Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). The Court was confronted with incon-
sistent law in lower federal courts. See Voytas v. United States, 256 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1958); E. Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D. C. Cir. 1955); United
States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Landon v. United States, 197 F.2d
128 (2d Cir. 1952). Note that, based upon legislative hearings, the Court departed
from the established conflicts rule that the place of the injury controls all actions
accruing therefrom. The Court instead gave effect to the rule that the law of the
place where the negligent act occurred, and not the place of operative effect, should
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